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1Abstract
The welfare effects of GM (genetic modiﬁcation)-led productivity growth for cassava
producers are partly affected by the characteristics of individual cassava producing house-
holds. Those household characteristics include the elasticity of production and home con-
sumption of cassava. Some studies assume the inelastic home consumption when con-
ducting ex-ante welfare effects analysis for subsistence crops. This study modiﬁes the
estimation methods used in the past literature to estimate both elasticities using the dataset
from Benin. Several assumptions are also tested regarding the heterogeneity of cassava
producers. On estimation of elasticities, the paper tests the hypothesis that on-farm sellers
are characteristically different from off-farm sellers by employing the double hurdle model.
The ﬁndings contribute to the literatures analyzing the distributional effects of welfare ef-
fects from GM-led productivity growth for cassava, which are gaining importance in the
context of the policy impacts on poverty reduction.
Key word: cassava, subsistence, double-hurdle, non-nested test
JEL classiﬁcations: Q11, Q12
1 Background story and research questions
1.1 Background story and motivation of study
The recent advancement of biotechnology such as genetic engineering provides better
prospects for many African countries to increase the agricultural productivity. Many orphan
crops like cassava which has been underinvested for variety improvement research may also
beneﬁt from the application of genetic engineering.
The actual return from cassava productivity growth in an African country and how the re-
turn will be shared by different population groups, however, depends on many socio-economic
factors including the characteristics of cassava producers and how they respond to cassava pro-
ductivity growth.
Cassava producers can respond in several ways to the opportunity of lower production
costs by transgenic cassava. Adopting transgenic cassava, producers can either produce more,
probably sell more and consume more or less. Or, a producer may produce, consume and sell
the same amount of cassava at lower costs. These two behaviors of producers lead to different
2effects on the market price and farmgate price of cassava, and thus different effects on welfare
of cassava producers and consumers. Which of these are more likely has, however, been less
studied by the past literature, although the latter seems to be implicitly assumed in several
studies.
Aforementioned characteristics of subsistence cassava producers are partly observed by
the elasticities of productions, sales and own consumptions with respect to the farmgate cassava
prices.
Few studies estimate the elasticity of home consumption of agricultural commodity pro-
duced by subsistence producers with respect to the farmgate price of those commodities. To-
queroetal.(1975)ﬁndthatthericeconsumptionbysubsistencericeproducersinthePhilippines
is rather price inelastic. Some studies assume the inelastic home consumption to conduct the
ex-ante welfare analysis of GM-led productivity growth (Qaim, 2001). How the ﬁndings from
Toquero et al. (1975) is relevant to African countries is, however, unclear since many African
households consume several staple crops other than cassava unlike in the Philippines where the
rice is the predominant staple crops. Many studies estimate the elasticity of market supply of
agricultural commodities by subsistence producers, which can be estimated without the infer-
ence on the elasticity of home consumption. As is discussed in section 3.1, however, the home
consumption of cassava can be elastic to the farmgate price under certain conditions, which
may affect the welfare effects as was discussed in the previous chapter. The Benin dataset used
in this study contains the information required to estimate the elasticity of home consumption
of cassava.
31.2 Research question
One important factor that inﬂuences the elasticities is the high transactions cost in many
developing countries. While proportional transactions costs inﬂuence the quantity sold, pro-
duced and consumed, the ﬁxed transactions costs affect whether to sell cassava or not, and
possibly where to sell. These transactions costs oftentimes vary across different producers and
are unobserved or only partially observed.
Some complications arise when estimating aforementioned elasticities to incorporate the
unobserved transactions costs. First, the estimation needs to be corrected for the sample selec-
tion bias since the elasticities of production, sales or consumption with respect to cassava price
can be estimated only from the behavior of those who participate in the market. Second, sellers
may need to be differentiated based on where they sell cassava. In the case of Benin dataset
used in this study, there are two types of sellers regarding where they sell cassava. While those
who sell cassava at the farmgate (on farm sellers hereafter) report the farmgate price of cassava,
those who travel to the market (off farm sellers hereafter) report the market price of cassava
which includes unobserved proportional transaction costs.
A question of interest is whether off-farm sellers respond to the cassava price differently
from on-farm sellers do, or both types of sellers respond in the same way, when deciding on
how much to produce, consume and sell given the expected cassava price. The underlying
hypothesis in the former case is that if a high ﬁxed transactions costs exist to change the sales
location, a cassava producer ﬁrst makes a decision of sales location for cassava, and allocated
the resource to maximize his utility based on the conditions in that particular market. Some
cassava producers may prefer to travel to nearby market incurring some transportation costs, if
he thinks it too costly to ﬁnd traders who come at his farmgate and buy cassava from him, and
vice versa.
4The answer to the question above has an important bearing on how we can estimate the
elasticities that are representative of all cassava producers in Benin. If both types of cassava
sellers respond to cassava price in the same way, one can obtain the elasticities using the data
for on-farm sellers alone, which is beneﬁcial since no estimation is required for unobserved
transaction costs for off-farm sellers. If off-farm sellers respond to the cassava price in the
different way, a separate estimation is required for off-farm sellers, which also requires the
estimation of unobserved transaction costs.
Several approaches can be used to gain insight into the answer to the above questions
as discussed in section 4. This study employs the model similar to the “double hurdle” model
proposed by Cragg (1971). More explicitly, this study assumes that each type of sellers, in-
dependently from cassava price, make decisions on whether to sell cassava, and where to sell
cassavabeforedecidingonproduction, salesandconsumption. Thecrucialassumptionofafore-
mentioned independence to cassava price is inspired by the ﬁndings from Bellemare and Barrett
(2006) which analyze similar issues for livestock sellers and purchasers in Kenya and Ethiopia.
The assumption is important in our dataset since only the sellers and buyers report the cassava
price, and it is thus difﬁcult to analyze how the cassava price affects the cassava producers deci-
sions on whether to sell cassava or not1. The more detailed description of estimation procedure
is laid out in section 4.
1.3 Contribution of this paper
The contributions of this chapter can be summarized in the following ways. The ﬁndings
of the elasticities of home consumption and production of cassava together provide empirical
guidance to whether the ex-ante welfare effects analysis using EDM can be more informative
and accurate. The test for the structural difference between on-farm cassava sellers and off-
1Some studies include the price as an explanatory variable into the ﬁrst stage selection equation (Goetz, 1992)
5farm cassava-sellers provides an insight into how welfare gains from GM cassava will be shared
among cassava producers.
2 Literature reviews for the estimation of supply response of
subsistence crops
2.1 Literature on subsistence producer’s market participation decisions
Many studies estimate the supply response of subsistence crops in the market. Several
estimation methodologies are employed to incorporate the economic issues inherent to the
decision-making on the market supply of crops by subsistence farmers (de Janvry and Sadoulet,
2005). Strauss (1984) lays the groundwork for the estimation of production and consumption
decision-makings for subsistence agricultural households. Goetz (1992) focuses on the mech-
anism as to how subsistence farmers in Africa make market participation decisions given the
transactions costs each farmer must incur, and how that mechanism may affect the estimation
of market sales response. Goetz (1992) employs the Heckman’s sample correction methods
to consistently estimate the price elasticity of sales for rice in Senegal. Several studies follow
Goetz (1992) by employing various methods to incorporate the unobserved transactions costs
in estimating the supply response of subsistence farmers. Conventional Heckman’s sample cor-
rection methods are widely used (Heltberg and Tarp, 2002).
Bellemare and Barrett (2006) extends conventional Heckman’s sample selection methods
to test whether a livestock traders make market participation decision and sales or purchase
quantity decision sequentially. The ﬁndings by Bellemare and Barrett (2006) are in favor of
sequential decision-making, and suggest that some factors such as price are not considered
when livestock traders decide whether to sell or not.
62.2 Approaches in the literature to incorporate unobserved transactions
costs into elasticity estimations
One challenge in estimating the aforementioned elasticities is how to factor the unob-
served ﬁxed and proportional transactions costs into the estimation model.
One advantage of Bellemare and Barrett (2006) is the explicitly reported ﬁxed costs and
variable costs of market participation for each livestock trader. The dataset in this paper, how-
ever, contains only the transportation costs for some off farm sellers, which do not distinguish
between ﬁxed and variable transactions. Several studies propose an alternative approach to
incorporate transactions costs when no direct measures of transactions costs are reported, or
reported transactions costs presumably fail to capture the real transactions costs.
The unobserved ﬁxed transactions costs are often controlled by Heckman’s sample selec-
tions model as employed in many studies Goetz (1992); Heltberg and Tarp (2002). Renkow,
Hallstrom, and Karanja (2004) estimates ﬁxed transactions costs as functions of explanatory
variables using a model different from Heckman’s model. The ﬁndings by Renkow, Hallstrom,
and Karanja (2004) provides this study with insight into which explanatory variables should be
used to explain the market participation decisions by cassava producers.
Alternative methods to analyze the unobserved FTC are proposed several studies. Key,
Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2000) relaxes the restriction of the common threshold for sample se-
lection assumed in Heckman’s approach and allows thresholds to vary across each household.
Holloway, Barrett, and Ehui (2005) employ Bayesian econometrics model to obtain robust esti-
mates of the structural equation for milk sales in Ethiopia, as well as a minimum sales quantity
threshold that traders decide to enter the market. While the aforementioned approaches pro-
vide room to improve the elasticity estimates, this study, however, adheres to the conventional
Heckman’s sample selection approach due to the following reasons. The stochastic threshold
7approach by Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2000) requires that price is reported for all obser-
vations, and inapplicable to our dataset which reports prices only for sellers and buyers. The
Bayesian approach by Holloway, Barrett, and Ehui (2005) may be complicated when applied to
the estimation with dual selection criteria which this focuses on.
The Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2000) and Vakis, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2003) em-
ploy models in which the unobserved proportional transactions costs are approximated as linear
functions of a set of explanatory variables including reported PTC. While Key, Sadoulet, and
deJanvry(2000)simplyaddsthosePTC-relatedexplanatoryvariablestothestructuralequation,
Vakis, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2003) regresses reported PTC on other PTC-related explana-
tory variables to obtain predicted PTC and adds the predicted PTC to the structural equation.
Recently Henning and Henningsen (2007) followed Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2000), al-
though referring Vakis, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2003) when selecting PTC-related variables.
This study follows Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2000) by arguing that the approach by Key,
Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2000) is more robust to the functional form of PTC and the estimation
is less complicated, as described more in Section 4.
Some of the recent papers center their focus on the estimation of the unobserved trans-
actions costs in addition to the supply response. Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2000), with the
information of both farmgate price and purchase price of maize in Kenya, estimate jointly the
price elasticities of supply and demand by maize producing households and transaction costs.
The estimation methods by Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2000) or Holloway, Barrett, and
Ehui (2005) are computationally formidable, although methods are expected to provide better
estimates of elasticities than when the unobserved thresholds are ignored.
82.3 Literature comparing on-farm sellers and off-farm sellers
Fafchamps and Hill (2005) analyzes factors that affect the decision-making on where to
sell, and conduct empirical analysis for coffee producers in Uganda. Findings by Fafchamps
and Hill (2005) suggests that the opportunity costs of traveling play a key role in deciding
where to sell, and coffee producers with a larger sales quantity tend to travel to the market. This
argument is supported by Fafchamps, Gabre-Madhin, and Minten (2005) which suggests no
economies of scale for traders thus farmers with large sales quantity do not necessarily attract
more pick-up traders with lower transactions costs.
2.4 Literature analyzing the behavior under two-selection criteria
The sample selection model proposed by Heckman (1979) have been extended to the case
of multiple selection criteria by Catsiapis and Robinson (1982) and Maddala (1983). Several
studies apply the model with dual selection criteria. Vijverberg (1995) analyzes the labor-wage
relationship in Ivory Coast when the wage and labor is observed only for those who ﬁrst migrate
to the city, and then decide to work given the wage they receive.
93 Conceptual framework
This section summarizes the theoretical framework that describes the behavior by cassava
producers. The deﬁnition of parameters are on Table 1.
3.1 Utility maximization by the cassava producing households
Table 1: Deﬁnition of parameters
Parameters Deﬁnition
Ak Endowment in good k
ck Consumption of good k
G() Production technology
mk Net supply of k to (purchase of k from) the market
pm
k Market price of goods k
qk Production of goods k
T Exogenous transfers and other incomes
tR
p Proportional transaction costs for type-R producer
tR
f Fixed transaction costs for type-R producer
tS
f Fixed transaction costs for type-S seller
xk Input k
U(c;zu) Utility as a function of c and zu
Wk non-productive liquid household wealth at the beginning of period
zu Exogenous shifters in utility
zc Exogenous shifters in demand function
zq Exogenous shifters in production function
IR
k =1 if a producer is in regime R 8R 2 fBuyer, Autarky, Sellerg
IS
k =1 if a seller is of type S 8S 2 fOn farm seller, Off farm sellerg
l Lagrange multiplier for proﬁt
m Lagrange multiplier
f Lagrange multiplier for production technology
Extending Bellemare and Barrett (2006) and Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2000), a cas-




































































G(q;x;zq) = 0 (3.6)
ckt;qkt;xkt  0 (3.7)
It is important to note ﬁrst that there are three time period t = 0;1;2, in each of which period
there is corresponding utility measure ut(ck;zu). Here we assume that a producer determines IR
t
at t = 0, IS
t at t = 1, qR
t at t = 2. The utility maximization at t = 2 can therefore be solved by
usual ﬁrst order conditions, which will be expressed in section 3.1.1.
As in Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2000) and Bellemare and Barrett (2006), conditions
(3.2) through (3.6) are interpreted as the following; the cash condition (3.2) states that revenues
from all sales an other income transfers must cover expenditures on all purchases. the condition
(3.3) requires that for each of K goods, consumption, input use, sales quantity must be equal to
the production, purchase and endowment in the beginning of period t. (3.4) states the condition
for the unproductive liquid wealth in the beginning of period 0 and 1, which is affected by
the ﬁxed cost of market participation. The condition (3.6) sates the production technology that
determines how the inputs and the outputs are related.
In period t = 0, a producer chooses a regime out of 3 regimes, namely a seller, autarky,
a buyer based on the relevant characteristics of himself or the markets. The producer, after
deciding to be a seller, decides t = 1 whether to be a on-farm seller or an off-farm seller based
11on some characteristics. decides cassava production and inputs based on the expected cassava
price and input costs in t = 2. The producer who decided to be autarkic decides in period
t = 2 the production and inputs based on factors such as utility from cassava consumption






cassava;2 and qcassava;0 = mcassava;0 = qcassava;1 = mcassava;1 = 0. IS
cassava;0
is undeﬁned here since a producer does not decide which seller to be before he decides to be a
seller at all in period t = 0. In other words, the regime choices are made only in t = 0 and t = 1
while cassava production, sales and consumption decisions are made only in t = 2.
3.1.1 Empirical strategy
The elasticities of production and consumption of cassava with respect to the farmgate
price are obtained as the relationship between the solutions in utility maximization problem
(3.1) and the cassava price. Although the speciﬁcations (3.1) through (3.7) consists of three
period t(t = 0;1;2), ck is solved for only t = 2, meaning that the usual ﬁrst order condition can
be used to obtain the solutions. Modifying Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2000), Lagrangian

































































































(3.13) indicates that, if l > 0 and the utility is strictly concave with respect to the consumption









6= 0 (more speciﬁcally, > 0) motivates the estimation of
homeconsumptionelasticity, whichKey, Sadoulet, anddeJanvry(2000)excludebutisincluded
by Renkow, Hallstrom, and Karanja (2004).
The conditions (3.9) through (3.12) involve endogenous variables ck, qk and xk and all the
relevant exogenous variables. All Lagrange multipliers mk, fk and l are the functions of the
combinations of variables.
The price elasticity of supply of cassava for a cassava producing household is essentially
the relationship between q
k and pm
k determined by (3.9) through (3.12). The estimation of
elasticity of each endogenous variables with respect to pm
k in (3.9) through (3.12) reduces to
regressing each endogenous variable independently or jointly on all the exogenous variables in
the system (3.9) through (3.12).
13The reduced form is generally then,







where P is the relevant price of cassava, and pk, wl are the sales price of k-th commodity other
than cassava and `-th inputs while zm are other factors that affect production, consumption of
cassava.
3.1.2 Comparison of simultaneous decision-making and sequential-decision making
The ﬁrst order conditions in the previous section illustrates the mechanism of how we ob-
serve the relationship between household production, consumption of cassava and its farmgate
price. More generally, the solutions IR
t and qR
t for utility maximization problem (3.1) are ob-
tained as reduced forms which are the functions of all the exogenous parameters in (3.1). The
expressions of IR
t and qR
t are, however, different depending on whether a cassava producer
makes decisions simultaneously or sequentially as in Bellemare and Barrett (2006). Sequential

















0 is the decision made at t = 0 on whether to sell or not, IS
1 is the decision made
at t = 1 on which type of seller to be, and qRS
2 is the quantity of production, consumption and
sales decided at t = 2.










The differences between sequential and simultaneous decision-making are that some factors
like tR
f do not directly enter into the quantity equation (3.17).
The main theme of this study is to compare empirically (3.16) thorough (3.17) and (3.18)
through (3.19) to see which scenario better explains the behavior of cassava producers.
3.1.3 Reasons for favoring the sequential decision-making in this study
The main theme of Bellemare and Barrett (2006) is to test if sequential decision-makings
(3.16) and (3.17) better explain livestock traders’ behaviors than the simultaneous decision-
making (3.19), which this study does not test. Instead, this study tests
Very few sellers in the dataset (7 out of 217 sellers) report sales both at the farm and at
the distant market, indicating that most sellers sell cassava either only at the farmgate or only
at the distant market. This paper thus argues that many cassava sellers are more likely to decide
ﬁrst where to sell cassava, and decide production and consumption decision.
Asequential decision-makingin aforementionedframework isempiricallysupported over
simultaneous decision-making by Bellemare and Barrett (2006) for livestock traders in Kenya
and Ethiopia.
The assumption of sequential decision-making in the above framework allows one to
empirically estimate supply and demand elasticities with dataset in which cassava producers
report price only when they decide to participate in the market.
153.1.4 Why do we analyze the actual production and demand instead of market supply
and demand?
(1) We have not only the marketed quantity data, but also the data for home consumption
by net sellers and production by net buyers. (2) We can not deny that the home consumption
by net sellers has no information available in estimating the market demand behavior by the net
buyers. Similarly, we cannot deny that the production behavior bynet buyers has no information
availableinestimatingthemarketsupplybehaviorbythenetsellers. Inthesecases, itisdoubtful
whethertheinformationcontainedinactualproductionanddemandbehaviorshouldbeignored.
The author argues that the information about the actual production and home consumption
behaviorshouldbeincludedintheestimation. Inordertodothat, itisprobablybettertoestimate
the elasticity of actual production and demand. The elasticities for these in the market can be
automatically obtained from the combination of production and home consumption elasticities.
Assumptionofsequentialdecisionmakingversussimultaneousdecision-making Thestudy
by Bellemare and Barrett (2006) suggests that producers make market-participation decisions
and traded quantities sequentially rather than simultaneously. With an ideal dataset, one inter-
esting research question is whether the same ﬁnding holds for cassava producers in Benin. The
analysis by Bellemare and Barrett (2006), however, cannot be applied to this study due to the
following reasons; 1)In Benin dataset, we observe cassava price only for sellers and buyers, but
not for autarkic producers. 2)the dataset used by Bellemare and Barrett (2006) contains more
detailed information about the variable costs and ﬁxed cost of market sales or purchases, while
Benin dataset contains very limited information about those costs. The ﬁnding by Bellemare
and Barrett (2006), however, does provide one empirical example in which producers in the
agricultural sector make market participation decisions not based on the expected price. This
16study thus argues that the same assumption for cassava producers in Benin may be appropriate
and (3.14) can be consistently estimated without having the cassava price for autarkic producers
if the self-selection bias is appropriately corrected.
174 Estimation of the model
This section ﬁrst describes the estimation procedures used in this study, and then discuss
issues associated with the estimation model.
4.1 Estimation procedure
In order to consider the potential simultaneity and dual criteria selection bias discussed in
the conceptual framework in the previous section, this study proposes the following estimation
procedure;
1. Estimate the market participation equation and seller-type equation by ordered probit
(4.1) and probit (4.2)
Isell or not















































in which f() and F() are probability density
function and distribution function from normal distribution, respectively.
3. Estimate the equations for on-farm sellers (4.3) and off-farm sellers (4.4),
qh




































h = (production, sales, consumption)
18separately by using the two-stage least squares (2SLS) or jointly using the three-stage
least squares (3SLS), with ˆ l’s included into the instrumental variables.
Several issues must be discussed regarding the procedures (4.1) through (4.4). In particu-
lar, the following subsections 4.1.1 through 4.1.2 discuss why this study apply dual-l approach,
how the estimations account for unobserved proportional transactions cost (PTC) for off-farm
sellers. The other issues including technical details are discussed in the appendix C.
4.1.1 Correction of sample selection bias associated with multiple decision-making cri-
teria
Vijverberg (1995) summarizes some of the methods used in the past studies which include
conditional logit model and nested logit model.
Using conditional logit model assumes the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIE).
For example, suppose the change in characteristics of distant cassava market affects the proba-
bility that a producer becomes off-farm seller and thus the probability that a producer becomes
one of the other three types, on-farm seller, stay autarkic, become buyer. IIE assumes that the
proportion of each probability that a producer becomes on-farm seller, stay autarkic, or buyer
remains unchanged.
This studies argue that, for cassava producers who often face signiﬁcant ﬁxed cost of
participating the market, the decision of where to sell (choice between regime 2 and regime 3)
is more likely to be nested in the preceding decision of whether to sell cassava at all. If so, the
IIE assumption is unlikely to hold and thus Conditional logit model may be inappropriate.
In order to incorporate the nested structure in multiple decision-making, nested-logit
model may be used. Vijverberg (1995), however, points out several shortcomings of nested
logit approach. Nested logit model combines multiple selection effects into one selection ef-
19fect. The combined selection effects sometimes, if not often, appear insigniﬁcant even when
each selection effect is signiﬁcant, if those selection effects somehow cancel each other out. Vi-
jverberg (1995) is concerned that the consistency of OLS estimate is in doubt if each selection
effect is signiﬁcant but insigniﬁcant if combined together. This study, therefore, apply dual-l
approach used in Vijverberg (1995).
4.1.2 Correction for the unobserved PTC
Our interest here is the relationship between production, sales, consumption and the farm-
gate price of cassava. While on-farm sellers report the farmgate sales price of cassava, off-farm
sellers report the sales price received at the market. The estimation of (4.4) for off-farm sellers
thus needs to be corrected for the presence of unobserved PTC.
Two methods are often considered by the literature to account for unobserved PTC in
this context. One way is to estimate (4.4) which uses reported market price and variables zPTC
i ’s
which potentially explain PTC. Another way is to obtain predicted PTC and convert the reported
market price into farmgate price using the predicted PTC.
Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2000) uses the former approach while Vakis, Sadoulet, and
de Janvry (2003) uses the latter. Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2000), however, suggest that
both approaches assume that unobserved PTC is a linear function of observed variables and are
interlinked. This study, although follows Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2000), argues that the
former approach is better due to its robustness compared to the latter approach.
Methodology by Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2000) and Vakis, Sadoulet, and de Janvry
(2003)
20Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2000) estimates the model,





PTCzPTC j = (sales;purchase) (4.5)
in which zPTC includes transport costs per unit, distance to market and other related factors,









i = aPTC+bPTCzPTC+glPTC+uPTC (4.6)
i : Household who reports transport costs
d PTCi = ˆ aPTC+ ˆ bPTCzPTC+ ˆ glPTC (4.7)
in which lPTC is Inverse Mills Ratio associated with the probability that a household i reports
transport costs. Vakis, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2003) then calculate the predicted value d PTCi
(including ˆ gˆ lPTC) for all households. (4.6) provides insights into which variables should go
into zPTC, which are then included into (4.4) to control for the unobserved PTC.
Although the method (4.5) is appropriate since the form of PTC is very difﬁcult to spec-
ify, it raises some complications to the estimation of (4.4). Strictly speaking, the elasticities
of production, sales and consumption and the coefﬁcients for zPTC should not be estimated in-


































21which is a system of equations with constraint (bPTC;h = bPTC;c). The estimation of (4.8) and
(4.9) is difﬁcult since the aforementioned constraint is actually non-linear (we estimate bh =






The aforementioned constraints are necessary only if we assume that not only the statisti-
cal signiﬁcance but also the magnitude of bPTC is informative (so that ˆ bPTCzPTC is the actual
measure of PTC.). Since the assumption has not been well tested in the past literature, it is
beneﬁcial to estimate another different model with alternative approach.
4.1.3 Estimation of PTC
Following Vakis, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2003) and Henning and Henningsen (2007), I








i + ˆ li+uPTC
i (4.10)
in which li corrects for the factors that make a seller to report transportation costs. li is calcu-
lated using variables so that PTCi is calculated for all households.
The equation (4.10) itself does not come into the estimation procedure (4.1) through (4.4).
The regression (4.10), however, provides insights into what variables should be in zPTC
i equation
(4.4).
2Although we use natural log of price in our estimation, the same argument holds.
224.2 Theory behind the estimation procedures (4.1) through (4.4)
We have the following assumptions with regard to the error terms in (4.1) through (4.4)
for each h 2 fproduction, sales, consumptiong (notation h is omitted for simplicity);
0


































































































pr 6=0 we run ordered probit and probit models jointly, and if son
off 6=0 we run (4.3) and (4.4)




off = 0, so that each equation is estimated separately.
235 Dataset
This paper uses Benin Small Farmer Survey3 collected by the IFPRI and LARES (Lab-
oratoire d’Analyse Regionale et d’Expertise Sociale). Table 14 (p.40) provides the summary
statistics of relevant parameters.
The dataset contains the information for 899 households. Among those 899 households,
this study starts out with 552 cassava producing households which report the quantity of cas-
sava harvested. The survey focus on the economic activities between April 1997 and March
1998. Out of the 552 cassava producing households, this study drops 9 households that are both
sellers and buyers of cassava as is done in Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2000) and Renkow,
Hallstrom, and Karanja (2004) since the model used in this study fails to explain the behavior of




the dataset. The size of cassava harvest varies considerably across households. Approximately
75 % ((2154 - 534) / 2154) of cassava harvested are on average sold by sellers, while a median
seller sells only 37.5 % ((400 - 250) 400). Most of the autarky households are small scale
compared to net sellers and even to net buyers.
Most households are located in the rural area. The nearest passable road and paved road
are 1km and 12 km away for a median household. Many households are also distantly located
from their farms (2km for a median household).
Many households rely on crop sales for their major source of income. On average the
income from crop sales accounts for 55% of the total income. Cassava sales on average con-
3Benin: small farmer survey, 1998. 2004. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute
(IFPRI)(datasets). “http://www.ifpri.org/data/benin01.htm”
24tributes to 12 % of the total income and 32 % of the total crop sales.
There are several variables that are subject to the potential simultaneity problems. First
variable is the price data, although the simultaneity of the price data is not due to the simultane-
ity in price and quantity as in the aggregate market since individual households are assumed
not to affect the market price. The simultaneity of the price data is rather due to how it is ob-
tained. Not all the price data were reported as unit price, but rather as the total value of sales
or purchases. 192 out of 217 sellers and all net buyers report total value of transaction and
quantity, instead of the unit price. This way of calculation does not always, although likely to
cause simultaneity. There is little evidence that only the price data calculated by total values
divided by quantity is causing simultaneity. While the correlation coefﬁcient between ln(sales)
and ln(price) are -.450 for the total values, it is -.766 for data reported as unit price. Therefore
it is still arguable that, if correctly instrumented by instrumental variables, the regression of
quantity on the price still produce a valid estimates.
25Table 2: Some variables included in estimation and expected signs














Cassava price 233 + + + + - -
Input prices
Hire labor or not 222 - - - - ? ?
Time for leisure 540 - - - - ? ?
Time for leisureˆ2 540 - - - - ? ?
Opportunity cost of land 540 - - - - ? ?
Farm size 540 - - - - ? ?
Distance to plot 540 - - - - ? ?
PTC related
Nearest phone service (km) 539 - - - - + +
Nearest passable road (km) 539 - - - - + +
Nearest paved road (km) 543 - - - - + +
Membership to cooperative 543 + + + + ? ?
Access to credit 543 + + + + ? ?
Have extension agent or not 543 + + + + - -
Own car/truck 543 + + + + ? ?
Own motorcycle 543 + + + + ? ?
Own bicycle 543 + + + + ? ?
Shifter
Age of hhd head (years) 543 ? ? ? ?
Household size 543 ? ? + +
Education of hhd head 543 + + + + + + ? ?
Gender of head 542 - -
Total income 542 - -
Retired income 543 + +
Total asset 543 + +
Distance to the source water 542 - -
Storage capacity 543 ? ?
Have extension agent or not 543 + +
# of traders in village
Grow
Maize 543 ? + +
Cotton 543 + + + + + + ? ?
Beans / Cow peas 539 - -
Chili 543 - -
Okra 542 - -
Rice 543 + +
Sorghum / millet 543 + +
Sweet potato 543 - -
Taro 543 ? ?
Tomato 543 + +
Yams 543 + +
266 Preliminary results
This section discusses the highlight of results using a series of tables. The tables in this
section use two symbols, ˆ b for estimated coefﬁcient, and ˆ S(b) for standard errors of the esti-
mated coefﬁcient. The presented results are still preliminary versions and are likely to change
in the future. The interpretation of the results at this point focuses on the overall meaning of
each regression.
6.1 Two selection stages
The results of regressions are presented in Table 28. For simplicity, I use notations as in
Table 3 in the following discussion of results.




on farm elasticity of production for on-farm sellers
e
pro
off farm elasticity of production for on-farm sellers
esales
on farm elasticity of sales for on-farm sellers
esales
off farm elasticity of sales for on-farm sellers
econ
on farm elasticity of consumption for on-farm sellers
econ
off farm elasticity of consumption for on-farm sellers
6.2 Analysis of proportional transactions costs (PTC)
The regression (4.10) was run to identify some of the important factors that affect the un-
observed PTC. As was discussed earlier, some off-farm sellers report more than one sales trans-
actions including price, distance traveled, transportation costs paid. Following Vakis, Sadoulet,
and de Janvry (2003), I here treat each sales transaction as individual observation, and run (4.10)
for 54 reported sales transactions. The results are reported in Table 4.
For distance variables, I use the distance to assembly point and the consumption market
(km) reported for each village by the village leader, instead of actual distance traveled by off-
27farm sellers. Although the actual distance traveled has better explanatory power, it may be
endogenous to the PTC, and also the variable is not reported for on-farm sellers, which is
problematic when we compare on-farm sellers with off-farm sellers in the later sections. I also
assume that the actual distance traveled may depend on the sellers characteristics which can be
in part explained by other observable characteristics such as the years of education of household
head, whether to have a membership to the cooperative, and distance to the phone services. As
expected, some of those characteristics signiﬁcantly affect the ratio between transportation costs
and sales quantity.
Table 4: Estimated log(PTC)
ln(Transportation costs / sales quantity) ˆ b ˆ S(b)
ln(distance to assembly point (km)) .474 .254
ln(distance to consumption (km)) .211 .201
distance to phone (km) .006 .004
household head education (year) -.138 .052





p-value (overall signiﬁcance) .000
R2 .305
No of clusters (village) 12
No of obs 54
Signiﬁcance levels :  : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
The results in Table 4 suggest that the variables like years of education of household
head, membership to cooperatives and distance to phone should be included in the production
and consumption equations for off-farm sellers.
Vakis, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2003) suggests that the predicted value from the regres-
sion (4.10) should be added in the production and consumption equations instead of adding
each explanatory variable. While their approach is beneﬁcial in terms of preserving the de-
grees of freedom in the production and consumption equations, this study argues that there are
certain drawbacks. First, the assumption that the PTC is a linear functions of certain explana-
28tory variables may not hold in our dataset, which makes the estimation more robust by adding
each explanatory variables instead of predicted PTC. Second, the predicted PTC is obtained
from the regression and thus obtained with standard errors. Including predicted PTC into our
production and consumption equations complicates the estimation of standard errors in these
equations since the standard errors then must be corrected for not only for l’s but also for pre-
dicted PTC. For these reasons, I add each explanatory variable to off-farm seller’s production
and consumption equations instead of predicted PTC in the following section.
6.3 Decision on market participation and seller type
Table 28 summarizes the results of ordered probit regression (4.1) and probit regression
(4.2).
The results from ordered probit regression suggest that the market participation decision
by cassava producers may be highly inﬂuenced by which region they live and what ethnic group
they belong to. It is plausible that the region of residence inﬂuences the market participation de-
cisions since regions often differ in many socio economic characteristics which are unobserved
in the dataset. It is, however, less clear how the ethnicity affects the market participation deci-
sions. One possibility is that the dummy variable for ethnicity explains many other observed
variables so that ethnicity dummy variables are highly signiﬁcant and many other variables are
insigniﬁcant. Dropping the ethnicity dummies, however, signiﬁcantly lowers the overall ex-
planatory power of the model as is indicated by the Likelihood Ratio test in the second row
from the bottom of table 28. I therefore conclude that the ethnicity of a cassava producer con-
tains important information not contained in other observable variables which determine his
market participation decision.
29Table 5: Results of ordered probit and probit regression (4.1) and (4.2)
Ordered Probit Probit
Dependent variable buyer = 0, autarky = 1 on farm seller = 0
seller = 2 off farm seller = 1
ˆ gopro Std.err ˆ gpro Std.err
Household size .002 .023 .027 .030
Gender of hhd head -.709 .408 1.112 .499
Age of household head .001 .007 -.017 .009
Education of head -.037 .036 -.051 .031
Dependency -.165 .143
Agricultural asset (1000 US$) .069 .075 .291 .137
Nonag asset (1000 US$) .339 .208 .130 .132
Farm size (ha) -.043 .034
Retired income (1000 US$) .368 .594 -.548 .486
Storage capacity (1000t) .004 .779
Distance to phone (km) .006 .007 -.047 .014
Distance to passable road (km) -.017 .008
Distance to plot (km) .056 .041
number of traders in village 3.536 .369 .157 .072
ag member -.157 .231
time leisure 3.272 1.103
maize seller -.018 .321
cotton seller 1.637 .656
bambara nuts grower .233 .562
bean grower -.096 .203 .008 .297
chili grower -.157 .320 .209 .636
cotton grower .061 .419 -4.957 1.563
ﬁnger millet grower 1.304 1.556
fruit grower -1.746 .714 .113 .974
ground nuts grower .186 .251 .299 .272
maize grower .232 .410 .518 .844
okra grower .238 .343 .637 1.236
onion grower .554 2.592
other vegetables grower .810 .388 .470 .641
rice grower -.235 .373 -2.000 1.271
sorghum grower -.557 .390 -3.287 1.121
soya grower .577 1.201
taro grower .579 1.268 1.463 1.497
tomato grower -.178 .276 .240 .314
yams grower .017 .409 .089 .548
dep2 1.866 .779 -6.501 1.471
dep3 1.066 .523 -.027 1.061
dep4 .775 .798 -8.160 1.617
dep5 3.735 .698 -5.941 1.332
dep6 .810 .723
ethnic2 -.040 .614 2.818 .751
ethnic3 .612 .463 1.059 .404









p-value for overall signiﬁcance .000 .000




p-value for ethnic = 0 (LR test) .000
No of obs. 535 207
Signiﬁcance levels :  : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
306.4 Production, sales and consumption decisions
Tables 6 through 8 present the results of important variables for each equation. The com-
prehensive results of regressions are presented in Tables 27 (p.47) through 29 (p.49) in the
appendix.
6.4.1 Cassava production equation
Table 6 indicates the following. There is stronger evidence that cassava production by on-
farm sellers is elastic to the farmgate price. The elasticity of production by off-farm sellers is
inconclusive since ˆ e
p
off farm is not signiﬁcantly different from zero, but also not signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from ˆ e
p
on farm. When two types of sellers are combined, the production elasticity reduces
in magnitude.
(Other variables)...
The coefﬁcients of the form of cassava (ﬂour, dried tuber) need to be interpreted carefully.
First, it must be noted that the base results without dummies for the form are for the fresh tuber
cassava. The dummy for ﬂour is one if the cassava producer report the harvest quantity (kg)
in ﬂour form, and similarly for dried tuber. All households used in the regression report only
one form of cassava. The coefﬁcients for the form contains two effects, one of which is the
difference in quantity due to conversion (ex. quantity reduces when cassava changes from fresh
tuber to dried tuber), and the other is the difference in the value per quantity after the difference
in quantity is controlled for.
With approximated conversion factor from Indonesia (1kg of fresh tuber  0.4kg of dried
tuber and ﬂour) as a reference, it is possible to extract the value of converting the form of cas-
sava from the coefﬁcient estimates. The ˆ d and its standard error ˆ S(d) in the tables 6 through 8
can be interpreted in the following way. For example, .143 in production equation means that,
31for cassava on-farm sellers .143kg of fresh tuber cassava plus added value of converting fresh
tuber to ﬂour is equivalent to 1kg of fresh tuber cassava. The form dummies are, however, in-
cluded merely to reduce the omitted variable bias in estimation of the elasticities, and the actual
estimate of value of converting forms of cassava should be estimated not from the coefﬁcients
in this study but in the different speciﬁcations of model.
6.4.2 Cassava Consumption equation
When estimated separately, home consumption of cassava by on-farm sellers appear re-
sponsive to the farmgate price while off-farm sellers’ consumption is again inconclusive. When
two types of sellers are combined, the hcon is estimated to be signiﬁcantly negative (ˆ hcon =
 :528).
(Other variables)...
Table 6: Cassava production with sellers separated
Dependent variable On Farm Sellers Off Farm Sellers
ln(Production(kg)) ˆ b ˆ S(b) ˆ d ˆ S(d) ˆ b ˆ S(b) ˆ d ˆ S(d)
ln(Price) .421 .173 .238 .182
Household size .181 .047
Education of head .066 .023 .029 .053
Total asset .608 .240
Farm size .087 .034 .086 .061
Bicycle, own -.338 .315
Motorcycle, own -.306 .382
Car/truck, own 1.874 .988
Distance to phone (km) .021 .007
number of traders in village .158 .068
ag member -.815 .322
cotton grower -1.235 .550 .039 1.138
maize grower -.632 .363 .622 .773
fresh tuber -3.018 .550 .143 .00 -.190 .397 2.25 .14
dried tuber -1.835 .470 .448 .01 .235 .536 3.67 .71
ln(consumption market (km)) .242 .172
distance to sales point -.002 .013
squared distance to sales point .000 .000
dep2 2.158 .215
dep4 1.275 .305
lopro .047 .028 -.170 .055
lprobit -.012 .096 .575 .339
Constant 5.608 .808 3.589 1.430
No of obs. 113 60
No of cluster (village) 30
Signiﬁcance levels :  : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
32Table 7: Cassava consumption with sellers separated
Dependent variable On Farm Sellers Off Farm Sellers
ln(Consumption(kg)) ˆ b ˆ S(b) ˆ d ˆ S(d) ˆ b ˆ S(b) ˆ d ˆ S(d)
ln(price) -.651 .224 -.579 .227
Household size .129 .046 .148 .055
Education of head .137 .066
Dependency -.269 .111
Total asset .722 .380
Total income (1000 US$) .262 .144 .139 .080
Bicycle, own -.076 .384
Motorcycle, own .266 .482
Car/truck, own 1.501 1.080
Distance to phone (km) -.005 .008
Distance to plot (km) -.014 .007
ag member .499 .415
maize grower -.297 .682 .654 .979
yams grower -.979 .708
ﬂour .803 .676 7.06 4.57 .948 .479 7.28 2.16









lopro -.195 .056 -.123 .069
lprobit .028 .146 .620 .436
Constant 7.9091.312 4.8141.755
No of obs. 106 59
No of cluster (village) 29 28
Signiﬁcance levels :  : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
33Table 8: Cassava production and consumption with sellers pooled
Dependent variable ln(Production(kg)) ln(Consumption(kg))
ˆ b ˆ S(b) ˆ d ˆ S(d) ˆ b ˆ S(b) ˆ d ˆ S(d)
ln(Price) .200 .109 -.528.131
Household size .066 .031 .105.034
Gender -.310 .337
Education of head .082.024 .001 .029
Total asset .265 .205 .000 .268
Farm size .112.036 .144.044
Bicycle, own -.080 .157 -.025 .190
Motorcycle, own -.181 .190 -.052 .236
Car/truck, own -.685 1.280 -1.057 1.597
Distance to phone (km) 6.995 .006 .001 .006
number of traders in village .086 .073
ag member -.226 .155 -.349 .191
cotton grower -.590 .471
maize grower -.264 .352 -.114 .477
yams grower .537 .292
fresh tuber -1.803.294 .433 .00 -.024 .337 2.60 .13
dried tuber -1.534.389 .585 .01 .266 .429 3.60 .41
ln(consumption market (km)) -.095 .085 -.024 .095
distance to sales point -.007 .010 -.004 .013
squared distance to sales point .000 .000 .000 .000
dep2 1.755.190
dep6 1.276.392
lopro -.029 .041 -.105.041
Constant 6.200.600 6.856.758
No of obs. 173 165
No of cluster (village) 36
Signiﬁcance levels :  : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
6.5 Summary of the ﬁndings
Table 9 summarizes the estimated elasticities of production, sales and consumption.
Table 9: Elasticities estimates
Method On farm Off farm Pooled
Production .421 ( .173 ) .238 ( .182 ) .200 ( .109 )
Consumption -.651 ( .224 ) -.579 ( .227 ) -.528 ( .131 )
Table 10 summarizes r, the estimates of correlation coefﬁcients with p-values in paren-




i in (4.1) and (4.2),
and uh
i in (4.2), which can cause the sample-selection biases in the estimation. For some equa-
tions (for example, sales equation for off-farm sellers), the results indicate the non-zero corre-
lations between all three error terms. The ﬁndings support the methodology in this study which
34include two selection terms (lopro and lpro) to obtain the consistent estimates of elasticities.
The sign of rpro has the opposite implication in the case of rpro. Applying the argument
by Dolton and Makepeace (1987), if there are two types of seller a producer can choose to
be, a positive rpro in on-farm seller equation means that the expected value of qh decreases
as the producer is more likely to be an on-farm seller. For example, a signiﬁcantly positive
rpro(= :629) for off-farm sellers sales equation, the more likely a producer (who has decided
to be a seller) chooses to be an off-farm seller, the smaller quantity he will sell as an off-farm
seller.
Table 10: Estimated r (p-value in parenthesis)
Method On farm On farm Off farm Off farm Pooled Pooled
Production ropro .062 ( .037 ) -.166 ( .054 ) .020 ( .652 )
rpro -.016 ( .128 ) .562 ( .331 )
Consumption ropro -.185 ( .053 ) -.152 ( .045 ) -.115 ( .001 )
rpro .026 ( .136 ) .857 ( .264 )
6.6 Comparison of two models
Table 11 summarizes the results of the non-nested J-test suggested by Davidson and
MacKinnon (1981). The results from the J-test can be interpreted as the following. The model
with two types of sellers separated seems to better explain the behaviors of on-farm sellers, than
the model with two types of sellers pooled together. On the contrary, the former model does not
seem to have any better explanatory power to explain the behavior of off-farm sellers compared
to the latter model.
The ﬁndings from J-test are rather mixed partly because many estimation models are still
misspeciﬁed, as evidenced by generally low p-values.
35Table 11: Non-nested J-test
Separate Pooled
On-farm sellers Off-farm sellers
Production .895 .000 .001
Consumption .003 .094 .007
The .895 in the upper-left cell is the p-value of the coefﬁcient on predicted value
obtained from pooled estimation in the separate estimation. p-value of .895 means
that the pooled estimation of production does not add any explanatory power to the
estimation of production for on-farm sellers.
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38A Description of dataset
Table 12: Deﬁnition of terms in this paper
Terms Description
Department Benin’s political unit, equivalent to prefecture: there were 6 depart-
ments at the time of the survey in 1998. See ﬁgure 2(a)(p.41) for the
location of each department. (There are 12 departments in Benin in
2008.)
Off farm cassava seller Households which produce, sell cassava and report sales point other
than “farm” and distance to the sales point
On farm cassava seller Households which produce, sell cassava and report sales point “farm”
Table 13: Description of some variables
Variable Description
Asset, agricultural cart, plow, harrow, tractor, cattle, work cattle, goats/mutton, don-
key/horses, pigs, poultry, other animals
Asset, non-agricultural chairs, tables, beds, other furniture, heater/oven, electric fan, ra-
dio/cassettes/CD, TV/VCR, sewing machine, bicycle, motorcycle,
car/truck, refrigerator
Dependency
#of kids( 14 years old)and elderly( 60 years old)
#of members between 15 and 59
39Table 14: Summary statistics of cassava producing households
On farm seller Off farm seller Autarky Buyer
No of observations 136 78 311 15
Mean CV Mean CV Mean CV Mean CV
Production (t /year) 5.6 ( 1.5 ) 3.2 ( 1.8 ) .4 ( 2.0 ) .5 ( 1.8 )
Consumption (t /year) .8 ( 1.4 ) .6 ( 2.2 ) .3 ( 1.2 ) .9 ( 1.1 )
Sales (t /year) 4.8 ( 1.6 ) 2.5 ( 2.1 )
Household size 8.2 ( .6 ) 9.1 ( .6 ) 9.2 ( .6 ) 11.5 ( .4 )
Dependency 1.2 ( .8 ) 1.1 ( .8 ) 1.2 ( .7 ) 1.1 ( .6 )
Age of household head 44.6 ( .3 ) 46.3 ( .3 ) 46.3 ( .3 ) 48.5 ( .3 )
Education of head (year) 2.7 ( 1.3 ) 1.7 ( 1.6 ) 1.4 ( 2.2 ) 1.1 ( 2.7 )
% of female head 3.7 6.4 4.8 13.3
% of female member 49.8 49.6 48.9 49.0
Farm size (ha) 3.3 ( 1.3 ) 4.1 ( 1.0 ) 5.5 ( .9 ) 6.3 ( 1.1 )
Cassava planted area (ha) .8 ( 1.3 ) 1.0 ( 1.0 ) .9 ( .9 ) 1.0 ( 1.1 )
Total asset (US $) 710 ( 2.0 ) 1195 ( 2.4 ) 955 ( 1.9 ) 2747 ( 2.0 )
Agricultural Asset (US $ ) 331 ( 3.3 ) 521 ( 3.5 ) 521 ( 2.6 ) 2449 ( 2.1 )
Income (US $ ) 1541 ( 1.3 ) 1743 ( 1.3 ) 1252 ( 1.1 ) 1404 ( 1.3 )
Storage capacity (t) 2.9 ( 2.0 ) 15.5 ( 2.9 ) 22.3 ( 7.8 ) 8.7 ( 1.1 )
Distance to
phone service (km) 12.2 ( 1.0 ) 20.4 ( 1.4 ) 24.8 ( .9 ) 25.5 ( .9 )
passable road (km) 2.4 ( 1.7 ) 6.8 ( 2.2 ) 6.4 ( 2.2 ) 18.4 ( 1.3 )
paved road (km) 8.1 ( 1.2 ) 17.0 ( 1.1 ) 28.5 ( 1.1 ) 39.5 ( .6 )
own farm (km) 4.7 ( 4.0 ) 3.3 ( 1.6 ) 2.9 ( .8 ) 2.1 ( .7 )
% access to rotating credit 76 64 49 33
% own car/truck 0 4 1 0
% own motorcycle 35 29 27 20
% own bicycle 62 72 74 80
cassava sales / total income (%) 14 ( .9 ) 19 ( .9 )
crops sales / total income (%) 51 ( .6 ) 64 ( .5 ) 68 ( .5 ) 48 ( .8 )
cassava sales price (US cent/kg) 49 ( 1.1 ) 150 ( .6 )
40Figure 1: Benin
(a) Location of department (pre-1999 reform) (b) Demographics
Source: FAO







% of cassava producers with the following land holding characteristics
Own 64 61 73 61 72
Use without pay 14 21 9 11 11
Commune property 10 1 1 19 17
Rent 9 10 14 8 0
Sharecrop 1 1 0 1 0
Other 2 5 3 0 0
% of cassava producers who belong to the following groups
Village group 35 15 35 44 25
Agricultural cooperative 10 17 6 7 6
Both of above 13 6 6 17 25
No 43 62 53 31 44
% of cassava producers who have access to extension agent
Yes 64 47 70 68 80
No 36 53 30 32 20
41Table 16: Number of cassava sellers with each sales destination by regions
Department (Prefecture)
Total 1 2 3 4 5 6
# of cassava producers 544 41 77 119 71 124 112
# of cassava sellers 217 6 62 20 23 90 16
# of on-farm sellers 138 2 45 11 12 68
# of off-farm sellers 79 4 17 9 11 22 16
# of reported sales point for off-farm sellers 84 4 17 10 13 24 16
Market 56 4 8 8 10 16 10
Family/Friend 21 9 1 1 5 5
Trader 2 1 1
On farm 5 0 0 1 2 2 0
Distance to the sales point (km)
mean 14 14 9 7 7 9 36
median 6 20 6 8 8 5 11








Fertilizer 5 12 5 3
Pesticides 1 3 0
Seeds 6 9 6 4 13
Hire labor 41 64 58 26 20








Household Consumption 93 92 82 97 98
Livestock feed 0 0 0 0
Gift, payment 6 7 14 3 1
Other 1 4 0
42Table 19: Frequency of cassava planting, harvesting and sales activity by month (%)
Planting Harvest Harvest(sellers) Sales
January 3 10 7 6
February 5 12 12 15
March 21 13 17 16
April 40 6 12 22
May 15 0 0 12
June 7 1 1 8
July 7 1 1 5
August 3 3 3 6
September 0 1 2 2
October 0 3 3 2
November 0 2 3 1
December 0 13 5 5
Year round 0 34 35 0



















bambara nut 0 0 0 2 4 3 5
beans/cow peas 34 21 37 39 38 47 29 37 57 48
chili 11 7 11 13 10 12 7 11 16 10
cotton 40 9 30 56 43 40 9 30 56 43
ﬁnger millet 1 0 0 1 0
fruit 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 5
ground nuts 0 0 0 0 25 19 26 26 38
maize 70 71 71 71 33 95 95 95 96 86
okra 13 3 11 17 14 22 7 12 31 24
onion 0 0 0 0
other vegetables 0 0 0 0 7 4 10 8 5
rice 4 3 3 5 14 7 4 3 9 14
small grains 0 0 0 0 7 1 5 9 10
sorghum/millet 8 1 7 12 0 26 7 12 37 43
soya 1 2 1 2
sweet potato 0 0 0 0 5 9 3 4 10
taro 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
tomato 21 21 19 23 5 22 21 19 25 5
yams 22 7 16 31 5 38 13 26 52 52
43Table 21: Cassava sales price by month (US cents kg)
All On farm Off farm
Mean Median CV Mean Median CV Mean Median CV
January 83 80 .8 22 23 .5 123 135 .4
February 57 25 .9 32 24 .9 86 98 .7
March 46 29 1.0 37 26 1.1 67 55 .7
April 27 14 1.2 17 13 .7 70 50 .7
May 34 13 1.4 20 13 1.6 128 124 .1
June 91 108 .6 71 47 .9 102 117 .4
July 88 116 .5 17 16 .4 109 118 .3
August 66 45 .8 31 30 .6 87 107 .7
September 114 151 .6 23 23 137 161 .4
October 36 27 .9 36 27 .9
November 13 13 .7 17 17 .5 3 3
December 65 33 .8 39 30 1.0 96 114 .6
Table 22: Cassava production forms by types of producers (%)
On farm Off farm Autarky buyer
Fresh tuber 88 35 17 10
Dried tuber 8 20 73 80
Flour 4 45 10 10
Table 23: Cassava sales forms by department (region) (%)
dep1 dep2 dep3 dep4 dep5 dep6
Fresh tuber 70 2 37 100
Dried tuber 100 98 7 21
Flour 30 57 79
Table 24: Cassava sales price by department (region) and forms of sales (US cents / kg)
Fresh tuber Dried tuber Flour
Mean Median CV Mean Median CV Mean Median CV
Department 1 42 40 .2
Department 2 13 13 .1 136 125 .2
Department 3 5
Department 4 43 19 1.3 20 20 103 117 .5
Department 5 33 25 .9
Department 6 102 120 .4 114 107 .4
All 27 20 1.1 56 45 .7 121 123 .3
44Table 25: Cassava sales price by months and forms (US cents kg)
Fresh tuber dried tuber Flour
% Mean Median CV % Mean Median CV % Mean Median CV
January 4 31 18 1.4 8 120 120 .0 3 119 117 .3
February 12 25 23 .5 15 85 85 1.1 13 120 115 .3
March 22 35 29 .9 31 43 50 .4 2 113 113 .2
April 29 17 13 .6 15 45 45 .2 7 121 120 .1
May 15 16 13 .3 0 10 130 120 .2
June 2 34 33 .4 23 34 35 .1 24 127 120 .2
July 2 15 12 .4 0 17 118 120 .1
August 4 27 20 .5 0 13 123 130 .3
September 1 27 27 .1 0 6 148 170 .3
October 3 26 24 .2 0 1 100 100
November 2 23 25 .2 0 0
December 4 37 30 1.0 8 120 120 .0 5 94 117 .7
Table 26: Cassava price with dummy for regions, months and form
price Coef. Std. Err. p-value
dep1 -37.85 22.93 .100
dep2 20.56 17.52 .241
dep4 18.42 17.97 .306
dep5 26.95 17.11 .116
dep6 -2.46 18.25 .893
February -5.22 7.04 .460
March -1.52 6.84 .824
April -13.43 7.12 .060
May -12.70 7.48 .090
June -7.20 8.11 .376
July -16.55 8.61 .055
August -7.04 8.08 .384
September 19.09 11.22 .090
October -11.56 9.75 .236
November -11.01 10.91 .314
December -4.66 8.44 .581
ﬂour 29.70 10.78 .006
fresh -78.42 11.48 .000
Constant 86.39 20.40 .000
45B Complete Results of the regressions
46Table 27: Cassava production with sellers separated
Dependent variable On Farm Sellers (2SLS) Off Farm Sellers (OLS)
ln(Production(kg)) ˆ b Std.err ˆ b Std.err
Heckman Original Heckman Original
ln(Price) .421 .173 .348 .238 .182 .326
Household size .181 .047 .050
Education of head .066 .023 .023 .029 .053 .056
Total asset .608 .240 .250
Farm size .087 .034 .048 .086 .061 .063
Bicycle, own -.338 .315 .335
Motorcycle, own -.306 .382 .415
Car/truck, own 1.874 .988 1.015
Distance to phone (km) .021 .007 .008
number of traders in village .158 .068 .083
Membership -.815 .322 .337
cotton grower -1.235 .550 1.118 .039 1.138 1.180
maize grower -.632 .363 .331 .622 .773 .804
ﬂour -3.018 .550 .773 -.190 .397 .513
dried tuber -1.835 .470 .565 .235 .536 .571
ln(consumption market (km)) .242 .172 .195
distance to sales point -.002 .013 .013
squared distance to sales point .000 .000 .000
dep2 2.158 .215 .304
dep4 1.275 .305 .215
lopro .047 .028 .031 -.170 .055 .056
lprobit -.012 .096 .141 .575 .339 .369
Constant 5.608 .808 1.416 3.589 1.430 2.004
ropro .062 -.166
rpro -.016 .562
p-value for overall signiﬁcance .000 .000
Identiﬁcation tests (p-value)
H0: Underidentiﬁed .006 .042
H0: Not Overidentiﬁed .051
First stage R2 .242 .348
No of obs. 113 60
No of cluster (village) 30
Signiﬁcance levels :  : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
47Table 28: Cassava consumption with sellers separated
Dependent variable On Farm Sellers (2SLS) Off Farm Sellers (OLS)
ln(Production(kg)) ˆ b Std.err ˆ b Std.err
Heckman Original Heckman Original
Price -.651 .224 .349 -.299 .205 .322
Household size .129 .046 .037 .185 .039 .047
Dependency -.269 .111 .134
Total asset .722 .380 .231 .441 .113 .135
Total income .262 .144 .117
Distance to plot (km) -.014 .007 .004
maize grower -.297 .682 .489
yams grower -.979 .708 .606 -.135 .366 .415
Flour .803 .676 .768 .437 .381 .557
dried tuber .658 .830 .329 .575 .524 .655
ethnic2 .309 .474 .351 -.672 .362 .427
ethnic3 .013 .892 .768 .340 .464 .552
ethnic5 .528 .734 .866
ethnic8 -1.214 1.254 .599
ethnic9 1.519 1.523 .860 1.254 1.052 1.264
ethnic11 -.031 .260 .228 -.939 .402 .461
lopro -.195 .056 .045 -.171 .051 .060
lprobit .028 .146 .160 .965 .297 .348
Constant 7.909 1.312 1.573 5.233 .897 1.267
ropro -.185 -.152
rpro .026 .857
p-value for overall signiﬁcance .000 .000
Identiﬁcation tests (p-value)
H0: Underidentiﬁed .000 .000
H0: Not Overidentiﬁed .064
First stage R2 .528 .560
No of obs. 106 59
No of cluster (village) 29 28
Signiﬁcance levels :  : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
48Table 29: Cassava production and consumption with sellers pooled
Dependent variable ln(Production (kg)) ln(Consumption (kg))
ˆ b Std.err ˆ b Std.err
Heckman Original Heckman Original
ln(Price) .200 .109 .326 -.528 .131 .295
Household size .066 .031 .024 .105 .034 .036
Gender -.310 .337 .478
Education of head .082 .024 .024 .001 .029 .032
Total asset .265 .205 .151 .281 .268 .288
Farm size .112 .036 .028 .144 .044 .047
Total income (1000 US$) .135 .052 .058
Bicycle, own -.080 .157 .194 -.025 .190 .210
Motorcycle, own -.181 .190 .182 -.052 .236 .254
Car/truck, own -.685 1.280 .964 -1.057 1.597 1.726
Distance to phone (km) .007 .006 .008 .001 .006 .006
number of traders in village .086 .073 .056
Membership -.226 .155 .168 -.349 .191 .207
cotton grower -.590 .471 .651
maize grower -.264 .352 .371 -.114 .477 .557
yams grower .537 .292 .342
ﬂour -1.803 .294 .590 -.024 .337 .584
dried tuber -1.534 .389 .477 .266 .429 .518
ln(consumption market (km)) -.095 .085 .133 -.024 .095 .102
distance to sales point -.007 .010 .011 -.004 .013 .014
squared distance to sales point .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
dep2 1.755 .190 .246
dep6 1.276 .392 .374
lopro -.029 .041 .043 -.105 .041 .043
Constant 6.200 .600 1.303 6.856 .758 1.192
ropro -.062 -.097
p-value for overall signiﬁcance .000 .000
Identiﬁcation tests (p-value)
H0: Underidentiﬁed .032 .000
H0: Not Overidentiﬁed .243 .058
No of obs. 173 165
No of cluster (village) 36
Signiﬁcance levels :  : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
49C Correction for standard errors in the second-stage equa-
tion
C.1 The estimate of standard errors robust to the intra-cluster hetero-
geneity
The standard errors for estimation equations (4.3) and (4.4) must be corrected for two
sources of heteroskedasticity. The ﬁrst source of heteroskedasticity is associated with the fact
that the survey was sampled using village as the cluster. The second source of heteroskedasticity
is due to the addition of l’s into the equations.
The formula for robust variance-covariance matrix under cluster-sample differs from that






















in which eij is the residual for observation i in cluster j. The standard errors from variance-
covariance matrix (C.2) are robust since they are less sensitive to the form of heteroskedasticity
inside each cluster (village in this case) (?).
C.1.1 Variance of error term in second-stage equation


























By modifying the equation (20) in Vijverberg (1995), we can express the relationship
between the sample variance s2











in which ˆ s1u = ˆ dl1, ˆ s2u = ˆ dl2 and b() is the bivariate normal density function for (v1;v2)
evaluated at (v1 = Z1g1;v2 = Z2g2).
Variance correction assuming uncorrelated decision makings


























50Then from Catsiapis and Robinson (1982) and Greene (1981), we can derive the correct
variance-covariance matrix for the least square estimates.




















Extending the analysis in Greene (2003, p.784), ˆ se can be calculated by,
ˆ se = ˆ sols+ ¯ ˆ dopb2
lop + ¯ ˆ dpbb2
lpb (C.9)
in which














ˆ lop;i (xop;iˆ gop;i  ˆ a2)
i
(C.10)

















Note ¯ ˆ dop and ¯ ˆ dop are the means only across sellers.































































Applying Greene (1981), Y1 can be expressed as,











































































5 ! (kLS+2)NLS (C.21)
Xop andXpb bothonlyincludeobservationsforsellers, andthushave(NLSkop)and(NLSkpb)
dimensions respectively. Therefore Y2 and Y3 are both (kLS+2)(kLS+2) with 2 being the
number of selection criteria.
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